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DIRECT TYRANNY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AS A
SAFEGUARD AGAINST HARMFUL MAJORITARIANISM IN
JACKSON V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND
ETHICS
*

Lauren E. Repole
I. INTRODUCTION

The history of direct democracy in America reveals great
tensions between public initiatives, individual liberties, majoritarian
campaigns, and the accountability of public officials to the electorate
1
as a whole. Though the initiative process certainly can be a method
through which voters are able to voice valid frustrations with
representative government and achieve reform, the process of direct
2
democracy has long been feared as a threat to minority rights.
Direct democratic processes are antithetical to American
3
governmental institutions. American government is founded upon a
4
healthy mistrust of majorities, and, as James Madison long ago
5
concluded, men are not angels. Direct democracy, generally, and
*
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1
See Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 105 (D.C. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). Woodrow Wilson reasoned that the initiative and
referendum were proposed “as a means of bringing our representatives back to the
consciousness that what they are bound in duty and in mere policy to do is to
represent the sovereign people who they profess to serve and not the private interests
which creep into their counsels by way of machine orders and committee
conferences.” John G. Matsusaka, Disentangling the Direct and Indirect Effects of
the Initiative Process 3–4 (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Papers/Matsusaka_Direct
_vs_Indirect_2007.pdf (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Issues in Reform, in THE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL XX, 87–88 (William Bennett Munro ed., 1912)).
2
See William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems
Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449,
449–50 (1998).
3
Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293,
294 (2010).
4
Id. at 295.
5
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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the ballot initiative, specifically, pose serious threats to vulnerable
minorities in part because the process of adoption is devoid of the
6
checks and balances that are integral to representative democracy.
Jurisdictions, therefore, must adopt proper safeguards to ensure that
minorities are protected from majoritarian campaigns.
Ballot initiatives in recent years have focused on the legality of
same-sex marriages, and this focus serves as an example of how
jurisdictions can use the initiative process to limit the rights of a
7
vulnerable sector of the general population. In the recent District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decision Jackson v. District of Columbia
Board of Elections and Ethics, the court upheld the D.C. Board of
8
Elections and Ethics’ rejection of the “Marriage Initiative of 2009.”
This decision exemplifies how safeguards can temper the most
deleterious effects of the initiative process, ensuring that it is not used
to promote discrimination, while allowing for a process of publicinitiated reform. Moreover, given the current pervasive use of ballot
9
measures to legislate social issues such as same-sex marriage, the
need for reform to limit the use of direct democracy is substantial.
This Comment will argue the need for reform in the use of the ballot
initiative to protect minority rights by adopting safeguards so that
human rights measures cannot be put to the ballot.
This Comment will survey the origin and use of direct
democracy in this country. Most significantly, this Comment will
emphasize the need to adopt safeguards to ensure the protection of
the rights of vulnerable minorities, generally, and gays and lesbians,
specifically. In Part II, this Comment will briefly describe the
processes comprising direct democracy. Part II will also survey the
history of direct legislation in this country, the current use of the
initiative in jurisdictions across the nation, and some of the criticisms
and defenses of the initiative process, focusing on the criticism that
initiatives can unduly target vulnerable minorities. Part III will
10
address two of the many important recent cases, Strauss v. Horton
11
and Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics. This
6

See David B. Magleby, Governing by Initiative: Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment
of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 45 (1995).
7
See Adam H. Morse, Second-Class Citizenship: The Tension Between the Supremacy of
the People and Minority Rights, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 963–64 (2010).
8
Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010).
9
See Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES (June
29, 2011), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/the-future-of-same
-sex-marriage-ballot-measures/.
10
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
11
Jackson, 999 A.2d 89.
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Comment proposes that the District of Columbia Council’s (“the
12
Council”) 1978 adoption of the Human Rights Act in conjunction
with the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendment Act
13
(“CAA”) properly addresses the Council’s legitimate concern that an
unchecked initiative process can deleteriously impact the liberties of
disfavored minorities. The outcome of this case stands in stark
14
contrast to Strauss v. Horton, in which the California Supreme Court
upheld Proposition 8, an initiative limiting the rights of same-sex
15
couples. Part III then highlights Justice Moreno’s dissent in Strauss,
which echoes the concerns of the District of Columbia Council in
adopting the Human Rights Act safeguard (“Human Rights
16
Safeguard”).
Part IV will consider methods by which various jurisdictions have
placed limits on direct democracy initiatives. Part V will provide a
theoretical and practical argument for the need for safeguards
against unchecked direct democracy, further arguing that the District
of Columbia’s use of the Human Rights Safeguard is effective to
combat the potential threat of harmful majoritarianism while
allowing the electorate to continue to participate in the initiative
process. Part VI will conclude by reaffirming the need for reform to
protect minorities from the adoption of ballot initiatives that curtail
minority rights. Though an outlier in practice, the Human Rights
Safeguard, which the District of Columbia uses, is important to the
discussion of how direct democratic methods can work in a
democratic republic, and ought to be considered in other
17
jurisdictions that offer the right to the direct initiative.
12

D.C. CODE § 2-1401 (West 2007)
D.C. CODE § 1-204.101–07 (West 2001).
14
Strauss, 207 P.3d 48.
15
Id. As discussed in greater detail infra note 144, the United States Court of
Appeals recently concluded that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d (9th Cir. 2012) (formerly Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010)). That ruling, while significant, does not affect the central
argument in this Comment. See infra Part III.A.1.
16
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
17
This Comment is not an assessment of the overall value of direct democratic
processes in the United States. There certainly are positive aspects of direct
democracy. Prior scholarly writings have contributed to the discussion of direct
democracy, and many scholars have addressed various issues related to the initiative
and referendum process in this country. These writings include the arguments that
courts should: use the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against invasion . . . .”), to nullify ballot initiatives that
threaten minority rights; analyze popular measures under the scope of the
13
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II. THE HISTORY OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
Before discussing the current need for reform in the use of the
ballot initiative to protect minority rights, it is helpful to examine the
origins of direct democracy in the United States. First, this Part will
18
define the processes entailing direct democracy. It then will survey
the origins of direct democracy, highlighting the goals of the Populist
and Progressive Movements, and discuss the modern era of direct
19
democracy beginning in the late 1970s. This Part will conclude by
briefly putting forth many contemporary criticisms of direct
democracy in general, and the direct initiative specifically, paying
particular attention to the concern that the direct initiative poses a
20
threat to minority rights.
A. Direct Democracy Defined
David V. Magleby, an esteemed scholar in the area of direct
democracy, defines direct legislation as “the process by which voters
directly decide issues of public policy by voting on ballot
21
propositions.”
Julian N. Eule divides direct democracy into two
22
primary subgroups: substitutive and complementary.
First, in
substitutive direct democracy, the electorate can completely bypass all
branches of government, thereby substituting direct, popular
23
lawmaking for the traditional, representative lawmaking process.
The ballot initiative, or plebiscite, is the ordinary form of substitutive
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; and
develop consistent standards with which to evaluate the ballot initiatives. See, e.g.,
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting:
Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 1 (1997). Moreover, in the aftermath of the Strauss decision and responding
to Justice Moreno’s warnings, Anne Marie Smith has utilized political and
constitutional theory to propose a revised initiative procedure that would not
threaten minority rights.
Anna Marie Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular
Constitutionalism: Proposition 8 and Strauss v. Horton, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 545
(2011). For a thorough discussion of many issues that scholars have discussed
relating to the direct democracy debate, see generally Linda Maduz, Direct Democracy, 2
LIVING
REVIEWS
IN
DEMOCRACY
1
(2010),
available
at
http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/view/lrd-2010-1/21.
18
See infra Part II.A.
19
See infra Parts II.B–C.
20
See infra Part II.D.
21
DAVID V. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1984).
22
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510
(1990).
23
Id.

REPOLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/29/2013 12:26 PM

689

COMMENT

direct democracy, allowing for “voters to propose a legislative
measure (statutory initiative) or a constitutional amendment
(constitutional initiative) by filing a petition bearing a required
24
number of valid citizen signatures.”
The ballot initiative can be further subdivided as either a direct
25
or indirect initiative.
A direct initiative is a constitutional
amendment and/or statute “proposed by petition and submitted
directly to the voters for approval or rejection without any action by
26
the legislature.” Jurisdictions that allow for direct initiative vary as to
whether the electorate can put forth a statutory initiative, a
27
constitutional amendment by initiative, or both. Upon approval by
the electorate, the proposal has the full force and effect of a state
28
constitutional amendment or statute.
An indirect initiative is
proposed by petition, which is first submitted to the state legislature
29
for approval. If the legislature fails to act on the proposal or if it
amends the original proposal in a manner unacceptable to the
proponents, the proponents may submit their original initiative to be
30
placed on the ballot for a vote of the entire electorate. Some states
that permit indirect initiatives allow their legislatures, in the
circumstances in which a legislature does not approve the submitted
indirect initiative, to offer a substitute initiative on the same issue to
31
be accompanied by the original on the ballot. Eule characterizes an
indirect initiative that the legislature adopts as a product of
representative democracy and describes an initiative rejected by the
legislature but ultimately voted on and adopted by the electorate as a
32
product of direct substitutive democracy.
Complementary direct democracy is most commonly known as
33
the referendum.
The referendum, in contrast to the initiative,
“refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their
34
approval or rejection.” The electorate and legislature act in concert

24

THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS
REFERENDUM AND RECALL 2 (1989).
25
Eule, supra note 22, at 1511.
26
MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 35.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 36.
31
Id.
32
Eule, supra note 22, at 1511.
33
Id. at 1512.
34
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 2.

OF

INITIATIVE,
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35

in order to ratify a measure. There are three types of referenda: the
mandatory or compulsory referendum, the voluntary referendum,
36
The mandatory or compulsory
and the popular referendum.
referendum refers to a state constitutional provision that requires
submitting certain legislative enactments to the electorate for
37
ratification. The voluntary referendum, on the other hand, gives
the legislature the option to refer a legislative measure to the
38
electorate. Finally, under the popular referendum, the legislature
enacts a measure and refers it to the electorate before the measure
39
can go into effect.
The recall is a third method typically grouped within the
40
overarching category of direct democracy. Through the use of the
recall, the electorate may remove or discharge public officials by
submitting a petition with the required number of signatures
41
proposing the removal or discharge. The entire electorate then has
the opportunity to vote on the continued tenure of the elected
42
Though this Comment will only address the direct
official.
initiative, the recall has recently been implicated in the same-sex
43
marriage debate.
35

Eule, supra note 22, at 1512.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. As will be discussed in more detail below, infra note 379, at the time of this
writing, New Jersey’s use of the referendum was front-page news. See Patrick Murray,
Trenton’s Referendum Mania, POLITICKERNJ (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.politickernj
.com/patrick-murray/54760/trentons-referendum-mania. Governor Chris Christie
and some members of the legislature called for referenda on important issues,
including same-sex marriage. Id. These public officials have called for a public vote
via referendum as a means to defeat the proposal where the legislature was posed to
pass it. Id. Murray warns that the referendum process leaves pressing policy issues to
the public, who “lacks both access to information and the ability to deliberate . . .
which our founders specifically said should be left to an informed, deliberative
system of representative government,” concluding that “you don’t put civil rights to a
public vote.” Id.
39
Eule, supra note 22, at 1512.
40
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 2.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
While this Comment will not specifically focus on the recall, the recall is
nonetheless important to the discussion of direct democracy as it relates to minority
rights, particularly to same-sex marriage debate. Its relevance is evidenced by the
unprecedented recall of Iowa Supreme Court justices who were part of a unanimous
decision to legalize same sex marriage in Iowa. Critics of the removal raise the same
concerns addressed in this article about the implication of these popular methods on
minority rights. See A.J. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics
/04judges.html.
36
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In the United States, the ballot-initiative process is used far more
frequently than the referendum, and is generally considered to be
44
more important and powerful than the referendum process.
Moreover, as the direct initiative allows the voters to completely
bypass the representative democratic process, the proponents of an
initiative are able to affect common governance without the filters
and checks and balances constructed within the state constitutions
45
and the U.S. Constitution to protect against the will of the majority.
This Comment will therefore focus on the substitutive form of direct
democracy, the direct initiative.
B. The Development and Adoption of Direct Democracy from the
Populist and Progressive Movements
As Thomas E. Cronin described, “[t]he initiative, referendum,
46
and recall were born in an era of real grievances.” In the early
twentieth century, Populist and, subsequently, Progressive reformers
proposed the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall as
47
antidotes to “corrupt and unresponsive state legislatures.”
The
genesis of direct democracy in this country is largely attributed to the
48
Populists. In 1885, two men from very different parts of the country
became the first reformers to propose the initiative and
49
referendum. Father W. Haire, a labor activist from Aberdeen, South
Dakota, and Benjamin Urner, a newspaper publisher and
unsuccessful Greenback Party congressional candidate from
Elizabeth, New Jersey, began a movement for direct democracy that
50
would soon garner serious attention throughout the country.
Prominent from 1875 to 1895, the People’s, or Populist, Party
emerged from the nonpartisan Farmers’ Alliance, a group organized
to ameliorate the impoverished conditions of the American farmer as
well as the ills of the country as a whole, such as greedy capitalists and
political corruption, which they believed to be the cause of the

44

INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE
PROCESSES 2, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop
%20Down%20Boxes/Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%20I&R
%20Processes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
45
See Eule, supra note 22, at 1525.
46
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 6.
47
Id. at 1.
48
DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 5–
10 (1989).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 5–10.
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51

farmer’s misfortune. Promoters of the Populist form of democracy
argued that direct democracy reforms would benefit the public at
52
large. Some of their selling points included that initiatives would
promote government responsiveness and accountability and that
initiatives were less susceptible to corruption and the influence of
53
special interests than the legislatures. Moreover, Populists proposed
that initiatives would promote educated discourse among the
populous and that direct democracy would lead to a more active, less
54
apathetic electorate. Initiatives could be used to address the tough
55
issues that risk-averse elected officials shirk. Reformers believed that
56
the general public would not be as corrupt as the legislatures.
The farmers’ groups, joined by other labor groups, began
57
organizing by rallying around their common plights. The Populists
58
held their first national convention in July 1892. The first major
success of the direct democracy movement came from the “Populist
59
strongholds of the midwestern farmlands,” as the movement for
direct democracy or direct legislation gained credibility in the late
60
1890s throughout the West. In 1898, South Dakota was the first
61
state to adopt the initiative and referendum. Yet, despite successes
in a few states, Populism never became a permanent or majority
62
party. The Populist’s campaign for direct democracy reached no
63
further than Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Progressives took over the
64
direct democracy campaign first fostered by the Populists.
The
Progressives’ stance against representative democracy was founded
upon several beliefs: they distrusted the influence of party bosses and
special interests, believed that the legislative process should be more
transparent, and reasoned that public officials represented party
51

CRONIN, supra note 24, at 43–44.
Id. at 11.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS,
AND COMPARISONS 17 (1998).
57
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 45.
58
Id.
59
SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 7.
60
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 50.
61
Id. at 51 tbl.3.1.
62
MATHEW MANWELLER, THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE COURTS: INITIATIVE ELITES,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (2005).
63
Id.
64
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 56.
52
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65

machinery, not the public interest. The Progressives, though less
radical than their Populist predecessors, sought reforms to
ameliorate their concerns about government corruption, and
66
continued the agitational role that the Populists originated.
Progressivism, at its core, was a movement to “restore popular control
of government and the Constitution” by making governmental actors
67
more accountable to the people. Progressives pushed their direct
democracy agenda by proposing such measures as popular election of
U.S. senators, primary elections, the referendum, the recall, and the
68
initiative.
Academic scholars have criticized the Progressives’ political
aspirations to rid governance from the sway of special interests and to
69
manifest popular sentiment through the policymaking process.
Some scholars highlight the irony embedded in the Progressives’
motivation to eliminate the legislation of special interests, as the
Progressives themselves were an interest group, while others criticize
the Progressives for being too idealistic and for discounting the
70
economic realities of the modern era of industrialization. Still other
scholars have discounted the Progressives’ criticism of representative
democracy and state legislatures as exaggerated and have criticized
the movement, arguing that the way to instill faith in the legislative
process is to reform the process and the legislature, not to bypass it
71
entirely.
This spotlight on the imperfections of representative democracy
at the turn of the twentieth century may be, in part, attributable to
the increased responsibility of state legislatures for economic and
public policy at the time of industrialization. During this era, state
legislatures increasingly faced issues about social welfare, banks,
72
railroads, mining and lumber interests, and land speculators. The
post-Civil War era marked the beginning of the modern age of
73
The role of government in
complex governmental regulation.
everyday life changed qualitatively and quantitatively, and public

65

Id.
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 24.
67
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2004).
68
Id.
69
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 57–58; see also MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25.
70
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 57–58.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 55.
73
See generally id.
66

AND
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74

mistrust grew correspondingly. As such, this period of change and
heightened awareness of government action saw a surge in the
75
involvement of special interest groups in legislative affairs.
World War I brought an end to Progressivism and to the direct
democracy movement, most significantly because the war gave rise to
76
new national priorities. Nevertheless, regardless of the criticisms
levied against them, the Populist and Progressive movements
remained present on the political terrain across the country. The
various direct democratic structures that these movements inserted
into many state constitutions continue to be an important part of the
law-making process in many states.
C. The Modern Era of Direct Democracy
1. Resurgence of the Use of the Initiative
The debate over direct democracy and whether voters should
77
weigh in directly on current policy issues has a long history.
Resurgence of the use of direct initiatives in recent years has
78
rekindled this debate. Prior to the 1970s, direct legislation was not a
phenomenon of major significance; only a few states east of the
Mississippi River demonstrated an interest in extensively using direct
79
legislation. In the 1970s, however, attention to direct legislation
80
expanded beyond its traditional western base. The nature of the
salient issues of the period, most notably a renewed and growing
distrust in government and frustration with state legislatures, at least
81
partially explains the surge in direct legislation in the states. While
corruption on the state and local level may not be as pervasive today
or in the 1970s as it was in the early 1900s, the influence of special
82
interests is as prevalent as ever.
According to Professor Matthew Manweller, most scholars agree
that the modern era of the initiative and referendum began in 1978
83
with California’s passage of Proposition 13. Proposition 13 was a
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
80
81
82
83

See id. at 55.
Id.
SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 10.
MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at ix.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 3.
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25.
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June 1978 California ballot initiative allowing Californians to vote to
84
cut statewide property taxes by more than half. The proposition
brought national attention to the controversial initiative process and
85
affected nationwide trends in the use of the direct initiative. First, it
86
spurred similar tax-slashing measures in other states. Second, and
more importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Proposition 13
inspired conservative interest groups to organize campaigns to
achieve their social and political goals, including measures favoring
the death penalty, English-only regulations, prayer in public schools,
87
and opposing pornography, abortion, and homosexuality.
Following the success of Proposition 13, the use of the ballot initiative
surged in the late 1970s, a time when many controversial ballot issues
88
appeared in various states.
According to the Council of State
Governments, the “initiative revolution,” which began in California in
89
1978, has not only continued, but has accelerated in recent years.
While historians emphasize Proposition 13 in 1978 as a
90
landmark in the modern era of direct legislation,
other
developments during this period are important to the discussion of
the initiative’s impact on minority civil rights. First, in the Supreme
Court’s 1967 decision of Reitman v. Mulkey, the Court held that the
California Supreme Court could invalidate an initiative the electorate
91
passed authorizing housing discrimination. The Court found such
overt state affirmation of discrimination in violation of the Equal
92
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Equally
significant to the conflict between minority rights and direct
legislation was Evangelist singer Anita Bryant’s 1977 campaign to
repeal the sexual orientation anti-discrimination ordinance in Dade
93
County, Florida, which began the first wave of anti-gay initiatives.
84

CRONIN, supra note 24, at 3.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 3–4.
89
John G. Matsusaka, 2004 Initiatives and Referendums, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
2005, at 388 (2005), available at http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs
/BOS2005-InitiativesReferendums.pdf.
90
See MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25 (noting that most scholars agree that the
modern era of the initiative process commenced with the Proposition 13 campaign
in 1978).
91
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
92
Id.
93
See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of
Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 606
(1994).
85
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Contemporaneously, California State Senator John Briggs led a
94
campaign that placed Proposition 6 on the ballot. Proposition 6
had the effect of severely limiting the rights of homosexual public
school teachers in the state by “permitting school boards to fire any
teacher who advocated, solicited, encouraged, or promoted public or
95
96
private homosexual activity.” While Proposition 6 ultimately failed,
it is important to acknowledge the role of these events when
considering the evolution of the same-sex marriage debate as it
relates to the ballot initiative.
2. The Initiative in the States: By the Numbers
To date, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
approved the initiative process; meanwhile, nearly every state
legislature and the United States Congress have considered adopting
97
some type of initiative process.
Approximately four-fifths of the
states that have adopted initiative procedures are west of the
98
Mississippi River. Fifteen of the twenty-four states allow for the use
99
of the initiative for statutes and constitutional amendments. Three
allow its use only for constitutional amendments, while six states and
the District of Columbia allow the initiative procedure only for
100
statutes. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia use only the
direct initiative, the process by which a ballot question is posed
directly to the electorate upon the proper number of petition
signatures; five states exclusively use the indirect initiative, the
process by which the ballot measure is only posed to the electorate
upon adoption by the legislature; three states use the indirect
initiative for statutes while allowing the direct initiative for
constitutional amendments; and two states use the direct and indirect
101
initiative for statutes.
94

CRONIN, supra note 24, at 94.
Id.
96
Id.
97
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 28 (the jurisdictions that have adopted the
initiative, in the order in which the initiative was adopted are: South Dakota, Utah,
Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Arizona,
Colorado, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Ohio, Nebraska, Washington, North Dakota,
Massachusetts, Alaska, Florida, Wyoming, Illinois, District of Columbia, and
Mississippi).
98
SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 10.
99
Id. at 27.
100
Id. As the District of Columbia is not a state, it does not have its own
constitution. Constitutional rights in the District of Columbia are derived solely
from the United States Constitution. See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
101
See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in
95
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D. Criticisms of Direct Democracy and Plebiscitary Procedures
1. An Overview of Contemporary Criticisms and
Justifications for the Initiative
While direct democracy has many supporters, its critics are
equally vocal. There are many objections to the use of initiatives and
referenda, but the essential argument against the use of the initiative
is that “[p]lebiscitary processes are less likely than representative ones
to generate decisions that reflect common conceptions of the public
102
interest or social welfare.” In other words, a public vote is less likely
to result in an outcome that is sound, balanced, and most beneficial
103
for all. Implicit in this concern is the idea that a mere aggregation
of will is insufficient to produce sound, ideal social decisions and that
“universal and rational pursuit of self-interest does not necessarily
104
generate an optimal collective result.”
In critiquing the modern initiative process in light of the
Progressives’ goals, political scientist Betty Zisk concluded that the
105
goals of the Progressives have not been met. Rather than replacing
interest groups’ influence, ballot initiative campaigns provide interest
106
groups with an alternative method to influence lawmaking.
Moreover, some of the common criticisms of direct democracy
include the belief that the average voter is not sufficiently informed,
sophisticated, or competent enough to understand complex issues
and make sound policy decisions, and that advertising, media, special
107
interests, and money can unduly influence the process.
Additionally, opponents of direct democracy argue that direct
legislation benefits special interest groups, not the people at large;
direct legislation results in long, complex ballots and frivolous
proposals; voters are not sophisticated enough to understand the
proposals and navigate the convoluted media campaigns surrounding
initiatives; the legislative process is superior to direct legislation for
policy-making; direct legislation will not serve to educate the public
and will not enhance public involvement; and direct legislation poses
108
a threat to democracy and minority rights. This discussion provides
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988).
102
Id. at 932.
103
See id.
104
Id. at 933–34.
105
BETTY ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 250 (1987).
106
Id.
107
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 11.
108
MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 30; see also MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25.
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only a cursory overview of the criticisms of direct democracy, and
scholars and opponents have put forth many noteworthy criticisms of
109
the initiative process. This Comment will limit its discussion to the
impact that the initiative can have on minority rights and, specifically,
the use of the initiative as implicated in the same-sex marriage
debate.
2. An Introductory Focus on Issues of Equality and
Minority Rights
Though the initiative process certainly provides means through
which voters are able to voice valid frustrations with representative
government, the process of direct democracy has, nevertheless, long
110
been feared as a threat to minority rights. According to William E.
Adams, Jr., “[b]allot measures directed toward various minorities are
111
frequently used by contemporary society.”
Detractors of direct
democracy posit that eliminating the safeguards built into
representative government poses a special threat to disfavored and
112
powerless groups.
Such detractors point to initiatives proposed to
ban school busing to enhance racial integration, to permit private
discrimination in the sale of real property, and to declare English the
113
official language of a locality.
During the last thirty years, and
continuing to the present, gays and lesbians remain one of the most
114
targeted minority groups in initiative campaigns.
In this regard, Barbara S. Gamble studied the incidence of
115
minority discrimination through ballot initiatives.
Analyzing data
after a three-decade study of ballot initiatives and referenda from
1959–1993, and focusing on five major civil rights areas, including
gay rights, Gamble concluded that initiatives seeking to limit civil
rights experience greater electoral success than all other initiatives
116
and referenda. Strikingly, voters have approved over three-quarters
of initiatives limiting civil rights, while approving only one-third of all
109

See generally id. (for a comprehensive analysis of the many criticisms of direct
democracy).
110
Adams, supra note 2, at 450.
111
Adams, supra note 93, at 603.
112
Charlow, supra note 17, at 529–30.
113
Id. at 530.
114
Adams, supra note 2, at 458.
115
Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245,
245 (1997).
116
Id. In addition to those affecting gays and lesbians, Gamble also surveyed civil
rights initiatives targeted to limit the rights of ethnic, racial, and language minorities,
as well as individuals with AIDS. Id.
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117

initiatives and referenda. Moreover, Gamble found that the public
has placed the rights of gays and lesbians on the ballot for a popular
vote more often than any other minority group, as nearly sixty
percent of civil rights initiatives during the period of her study
118
targeted gays and lesbians.
A more recent article confirmed
Gamble’s conclusion, finding that minorities are likely to lose at the
119
ballot box.
Many state initiatives in the past decade have sought to proscribe
120
same-sex marriages.
For instance, California’s Proposition 8 and
Alaska’s Ballot Measure 2 are examples of initiatives limiting marriage
121
During the November 2008 election,
to opposite-sex couples.
Arizona, California, and Florida voted on same-sex marriage ban
122
initiatives, while in 2004, eleven states voted on similar measures.
The hostility surrounding same-sex marriage first seized
widespread public attention in 1993, with the Supreme Court of
123
Hawaii’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin.
In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme
Court held that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples qualified as sex discrimination under that state’s
124
constitution.
In 1998, Hawaii state legislators responded by
proposing a referendum defining marriage as between one man and
one woman, which was approved by a margin of sixty-eight to thirty117

Id.
Id. at 257.
119
Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral
Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 20 REV.
POL’Y RES. 671, 676 (2003).
120
Morse, supra note 7, at 963.
121
Id. at 964. In 2009, Vermont became the first state in which the legislature
acted without judicial mandate to allow same-sex marriage. Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 14,
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430. Maine and New Hampshire
followed suit the same year. Id. Before a single same-sex marriage was performed in
Maine, however, a successful November 2009 ballot measure repealed the newly
adopted law. Id. In November 2012, voters responded by passing a ballot measure
allowing for same-sex marriage. Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for
the
First
Time,
CNN,
Nov.
7,
2012,
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-same-sex-marriage/index.html.
122
Tiffany Sharples, Ballot Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage, Anti-Abortion Measures,
TIME, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article
/0,8599,1856820,00.html
123
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED:
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1997).
124
Ballotwatch 2008, Same Sex Marriage: Breaking the Firewall in California,
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE 1 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202008-2%20%28Marriage%29.pdf;
EVAN
GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 44–45 (2004).
118
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125

two percent. Around this time, opponents of same-sex marriage in
other states—Alaska in 1998 and California, Nebraska, and Nevada in
2000— placed “defense of marriage” measures on their ballots; the
126
states’ electorates approved all of these measures. Unlike the other
states, which sought the ban by constitutional amendment, through
the passage of Proposition 22, California approved the ban by a
127
statutory initiative.
According to the Initiative and Referendum
Institute, same-sex marriage has been a particularly pervasive issue
since the February 2004 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case
128
of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in which that court found
129
a right to same-sex marriage in the state’s constitution. Responding
to the 2004 decision, same-sex marriage opponents throughout the
country organized to adopt state constitutional amendments defining
marriage as that between a man and a woman in order to thwart a
130
similar ruling in their respective states.
For instance, the highest
profile initiative in 2009 was Maine’s Question 1, which repealed a
statute legalizing same-sex marriage, by a fifty-three to forty-seven
131
percent margin.
As of November 2009, electorates across the
country have rejected same-sex marriage in thirty-three of thirty-four
132
ballot measures.
The conflicting case law analyzed in Part III
evidences the tensions between direct democracy and vulnerable and
disempowered minorities.
III. THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
CONTROVERSY: A CASE-BY-CASE COMPARISON OF TWO RECENT CASES
This section will discuss two recent cases, Strauss v. Horton and
Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, in which the
respective courts considered the validity of initiatives, one statutory
and one constitutional, attempting to restrict the rule of law allowing
133
same-sex couples to marry. The review of these two cases and their
disparate holdings will lead to the discussion of the District of
125

Ballotwatch 2008, supra note 124.
Id.
127
Id.
128
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
129
Ballotwatch, Election 2009: Same-Sex Marriage and TELS, INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
INSTITUTE
1
(Nov.
4,
2009),
available
at
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202009-2%20Results%20%28v1%29.pdf.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010); Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
126
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Columbia’s use of the Human Rights Safeguard to protect minority
rights against an omnipotent attack via direct initiative. Moreover,
the comparison will advance the proposition that other jurisdictions
ought to adopt direct initiative reforms modeled after the District of
Columbia’s Human Rights Safeguard.
A. Strauss v. Horton
1. Background and Majority Opinion
Legislating by initiative has been an important feature of
134
California governance since the process’s adoption in 1911.
On
November 4, 2008, a majority of California voters approved notorious
Proposition 8, which was the center of the controversy leading to the
135
California Supreme Court’s decision in Strauss v. Horton.
Proposition 8 added the following section to the state’s constitution:
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
136
California.” California’s initiative procedure distinguishes between
constitutional amendments, which are permissible subjects of direct
137
initiatives, and constitutional revisions, which are not. A revision is
characterized as a “wholesale or fundamental alteration of the
constitutional structure that appropriately could be undertaken only
by a constitutional convention,” while an amendment includes “any
and all of the more discrete changes to the Constitution that
138
thereafter might be proposed.”
This distinction was important to
139
the court’s analysis in determining the validity of Proposition 8. In
Strauss, the question before the California Supreme Court was
whether Proposition 8, a constitutional initiative defining marriage in
the state as marriage between a man and a woman, was a
constitutional amendment, and therefore valid under California’s
Constitution, or a constitutional revision, and therefore invalid and
140
unconstitutional.
In upholding the validity of Proposition 8, the majority reasoned
that its role was not “to determine whether the provision at issue is
wise or sound as a matter of policy” or whether the justices “believe[d]

134

DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 3.
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59.
136
Proposition 8, located at CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 7.5; see Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59.
137
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 60. Oregon also draws this distinction between a constitutional
amendment and a constitutional revision. OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2.
140
Strauss, 107 P.3d at 59.
135
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it should be a part of the California Constitution.”
Holding that
Proposition 8 constituted a mere amendment, the majority reasoned
that “the act of limiting access to the designation of marriage to
opposite-sex couples does not have a substantial or, indeed, even a
minimal effect on the governmental plan or framework of California”
142
In holding that the new
existing prior to Proposition 8.
constitutional amendment denying the recognition of same-sex
marriages carved out merely a “limited exception” to the scope of the
143
state constitution’s equal protection clause and principles, the court
effectively held that the designation of “inalienable” rights in
California’s constitution did not signify that these rights are exempt
144
from limitation or restriction by popular vote.
141

Id.
Id. at 62.
143
Id. at 78.
144
Id. at 116. As noted supra, note 15, a recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that Proposition 8 is
unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (formerly Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). In Perry, a three-judge panel
of the 9th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, concluding that the initiative power may not be
employed to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and to strip that
group, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to
marry. Id. at 1064. In so ruling, the court acknowledged but did not address what
the majority characterized as “[b]roader issues”: “[w]hether under the Constitution
same-sex couples may ever be denied the right to marry a right that has long been
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, is an important and highly controversial question”
and “currently a matter of great debate in our nation. . . over which people of good
will may disagree, sometimes strongly.” Id. Instead, the court adhered to the
principle of only ruling on the constitutional questions squarely presented in the
case and, thereby, decided the case on a much narrower basis. Id. More specifically,
the court focused its analysis on the “singular and limited change” that Proposition 8
worked to the California State Constitution, namely “stripp[ing] same-sex couples of
the right to have their committed relationships recognized by the State with the
designation of ‘marriage,’ which the state constitution had previously guaranteed
them,” while leaving in place all of their other rights and responsibilities that are
identical to those of married spouses and integral to a partnership. Id. at 1076.
The court went on to phrase the question presented for its consideration as
follows:
[D]id the People of California have legitimate reasons for enacting a
constitutional amendment that serves only to take away from same-sex
couples the right to have their lifelong relationships dignified by the
official status of ‘marriage,’ and to compel the State and its officials
and all others authorized to perform marriage ceremonies to substitute
the label of ‘domestic partnership’ for their relationships?
Id. at 1079. Answering this question in the negative, the court considered and
rejected a series of proffered justifications in support of Proposition 8, including
furthering the state’s interest in childrearing and responsible procreation, protecting
religious freedom, and preventing children from being taught about same-sex
marriage in schools. Id. at 1076–79. In so ruling, the court expressly relied heavily
142
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2. Justice Moreno’s Dissent: The Promise of Equality,
Compelling “the Will of the Majority to Be Tempered
145
by Justice”
Justice Moreno sharply criticized the majority’s finding that
Proposition 8 was merely a constitutional amendment and not a
146
In response to the majority’s holding,
constitutional revision.
Justice Moreno asserted that:
[d]escribing the effect of Proposition 8 as narrow and
limited fails to acknowledge the significance of the
discrimination it requires. But even a narrow and limited
exception to the promise of full equality strikes at the core
of, and thus fundamentally alters, the guarantee of equal
treatment that has pervaded the California Constitution
since 1849.
Promising equal treatment to some is
fundamentally different from promising equal treatment to
all. Promising treatment that is almost equal is
fundamentally different from ensuring truly equal
treatment. Granting a disfavored minority only some of the
rights enjoyed by the majority is fundamentally different
from recognizing, as a constitutional imperative, that they
on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
particularly the presence or absence of a legitimate state interest constituting a
rational basis for the proposition, and rejected as inappropriate any reliance on
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982). Perry, 671 F.3d at 1083–84 (firmly
rejecting the position that “unless the Fourteenth Amendment actually requires that
the designation of ‘marriage’ be given to same-sex couples in the first place, there
can be no constitutional infirmity in taking the designation away from that group of
citizens, whatever the People’s reason for doing so”). Ultimately, the court
concluded that the absence of any legitimate purpose for Proposition 8 compelled
“‘the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is borne of animosity
toward,’ or, as is more likely with respect to Californians who voted for the
Proposition, mere disapproval of, ‘the class of persons affected.’” Id. at 1080
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). Judge Smith filed a partial concurrence and partial
dissent, in which he said he would have distinguished Romer because of certain
differences he identified between Proposition 8 and the Colorado state
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer. Id. at 1096 (Smith, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
Though the court in Perry invalidates Proposition 8 under a rational basis
analysis and not because Proposition 8 violates an individual’s human rights per se,
the Perry decision is important because the court restrains the right to initiative,
prioritizing equal protection under the law over the majority’s right to direct
democracy. Id. at 1064 (“The People may not employ the initiative power to single
out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate
justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.”).
145
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 130 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
146
Id.
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147

must be granted all of those rights.
Justice Moreno reasoned that Proposition 8 does not merely amend,
but instead revises the California Constitution because it struck the
core of the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment by limiting
148
the rights of the disfavored minority.
In so doing, Justice Moreno
rejected the majority’s reasoning that Proposition 8 is only an
amendment because it alters only certain rights of a small segment of
149
the population.
Justice Moreno further reasoned that the Equal
Protection Clause’s role in protecting vulnerable minorities from the
will of the majority constitutes an underlying principle of California’s
150
Constitution. Therefore, the disintegration of a fundamental right
enjoyed by gays and lesbians as inflicted by Proposition 8 amounted
151
to a constitutional revision, not a mere amendment.
Contending that Proposition 8 should be invalidated because of
its implications on the fundamental rights of gays and lesbians, and
warning about the impact of the majority’s ruling on the rights of
vulnerable minorities, Justice Moreno further disagreed with the
majority:
Unlike modifying legislative or judicially created remedies,
withholding a fundamental right from a minority group on
the basis of a suspect classification is inherently antithetical
to the core principle of equal protection that minorities are
to be protected against the prejudice of majorities by
152
requiring that laws apply equally to all segments of society.
Justice Moreno emphasized the intrinsic inequality in withholding a
fundamental right from a minority group on the basis of a suspect
classification, stressing that equal protection means protecting
153
minorities against the whim of the majority.

147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 133–34.
151
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 134.
152
Id. at 136. California Attorney General Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown proposed
an interesting alternative argument to Justice Moreno’s argument. Attorney General
Brown argued that the court should find Proposition 8 invalid because it abrogated
inalienable rights protected by Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution
without a compelling justification. Attorney General’s Response to Amicus Curiae
Briefs, Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047 2009 WL 853622 (Cal.), at *2. While Attorney
General Brown analyzed Proposition 8 under a fundamental rights framework and
Justice Moreno based his analysis on an equal protection framework, both analyses
resulted in the same conclusion—that Proposition 8 was an unlawful constitutional
amendment under the California Constitution.
153
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 133.
148
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Justice Moreno recognized that the initiative process in
California was intended to remedy government corruption, serving as
an antidote to powerful special interests and the state legislature’s
154
“own self-serving inertia.”
Justice Moreno likewise acknowledged
that it was well-known that the widespread adoption of the direct
initiative came from the Progressive movement, but found no
evidence that the Progressives intended to preclude the court’s
protection of vulnerable minorities from the will of the majority, or
to abolish the judiciary’s role as protector of the fundamental rights
155
of the politically vulnerable. Justice Moreno distinguished between
preventing the influence of politically powerful minority groups, a
key purpose for direct initiatives, and “preventing courts from
protecting the rights of disfavored minorities unable to obtain equal
156
rights through the usual majoritarian processes.”
Proposition 8 began as a reaction to the consolidated California
157
Supreme Court case, In re Marriage Cases. In In re Marriage Cases, the
California Supreme Court decided by a four to three margin that
California’s exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage
158
violated the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee. Critics
159
By
characterize Proposition 8 as a “statement of disapproval.”
limiting the use of the term “marriage” to opposite-sex couples,
Proposition 8 implicitly rendered same-sex couples unacceptable and
160
abnormal, labeling same-sex couples inferior and disfavored.
Justice Moreno proposed that equal protection is not simply a
discrete constitutional right, but a “basic constitutional principle that
guides all legislation and compels the will of the majority to be
161
tempered by justice.”
Rather than take the technical, quantitative approach the Strauss
majority utilized, Justice Moreno appeared to adopt a more holistic,
qualitative approach to analyzing the constitutionality of Proposition
8, finding that the proposition drastically altered the nature and
162
operation of the California system of government. Therefore, such
a far-reaching change could not be achieved by constitutional

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

See id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
Id.
See Morse, supra note 7 at 984.
Id.
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 130.
Id. at 129.
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163

amendment, but rather only by revision. Moreover, Justice Moreno
warned that the majority’s holding weakened the status of
California’s Constitution “bulwark of fundamental rights for
164
minorities protected from the will of the majority.”
Even nearequal treatment, according to Justice Moreno, violates the promise of
165
equality under the law. This concern is also evident in the District
of Columbia’s utilization of the Human Rights Safeguard in its direct
166
initiative process. The importance of the Human Rights Safeguard
as a tool to protect minority rights is evidenced in the case of Jackson
167
v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics.
B. Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics
This section seeks to compare the disparate outcomes of the
Strauss and Jackson decisions. In Strauss, the majority validated a
168
direct initiative that limited the rights of same-sex couples.
While
the Jackson decision addressed the same issue, the Jackson majority
came to an entirely different conclusion by ultimately upholding the
169
rights of same-sex couples.
The long and technical history of the
District of Columbia’s sovereignty is also important in order to place
the significance of the Jackson decision in its proper context, and
therefore it is addressed below, along with a detailed discussion of the
case itself.
1. Home Rule for the District of Columbia
To understand the importance of the Human Rights Safeguard
as part of the District of Columbia’s initiative process, it is essential
first to consider the recent history of the District’s home rule, which
created the Council and gave the Council the authority to adopt the
170
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
initiative process.
characterized the District of Columbia as “a unique and complex
171
governmental structure.” Article I of the United States Constitution
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. at 131 (“Promising treatment that is almost equal is fundamentally
different from ensuring truly equal treatment.”).
166
See infra Parts III.B.1–2.
167
Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
168
Strauss, 207 P.3d 48.
169
Jackson, 999 A.2d 89.
170
See Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973).
171
Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441
A.2d 889, 916 (D.C. 1981).
164
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grants Congress complete legislative authority over the District of
172
Columbia. The fight for sovereignty in the District of Columbia has
173
In 1912, United States Representatives Tavenner
a long history.
and Prouty introduced home rule bills that incorporated initiative
174
and referendum procedures. Neither of the bills passed, and it was
not until 1973 that Congress granted the District of Columbia partial
175
home rule.
Direct democracy soon followed the successful
campaign for sovereignty.
The 1973 passage of the District of Columbia Self-Government
and Government Reorganization Act (“Home Rule Act”) brought
176
home rule to the District. The District of Columbia Charter, Title
IV of the Home Rule Act, established the District’s ruling elected
177
body, the District of Columbia Council.
The Charter granted the
178
Council considerable legislative authority.

172

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 48.
174
Id. at 228.
175
Id.
176
Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973). Importantly, the original Home Rule
Act contained two types of legislative vetoes. First, there was a two-house veto for
most actions, whereby Congress could block the District of Columbia Council’s
actions by majority vote of both houses. There was also a distinct one-house veto
from criminal laws, whereby one house could block the Council’s actions in the
criminal law context by a majority vote. Memorandum from Richard A. Hauser,
Deputy Counsel to the President, to J. Steven Rhodes, Assistant to the Vice President
for
Domestic
Policy
1
(Apr.
6,
1984),
available
at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/roberts/Box09JGRChadhareDistrictofColumbia10
.pdf. The landmark decision of INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the one-house
legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as unconstitutional,
called into question the validity of any previously enacted law that contained a
legislative veto mechanism. Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983). Due to the constitutional questions raised by the Chadha decision,
Congress replaced the legislative vetoes in the Home Rule Act with a joint resolution
of disapproval, which places the burden on Congress to nullify an act of the Council.
Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
273, 286 (1993), available at http://www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/legveto93.pdf.
177
Subject to Congressional oversight, as required by article I, section 8, of the
United States Constitution, the Home Rule Act delegated legislative self-rule to the
District of Columbia, authorized the election of local officials by the D.C. electorate,
granted District of Columbia citizens the powers of self-government, “modernize[d],
reorganize[d], and otherwise improve[d] the governmental structure” of the District,
and relieved Congress of the burden of legislating local issues for the District. D.C.
CODE § 1-102(a) (2001).
178
Id. at § 1-203.03. Generally, once the Council passes legislation, it becomes
effective after a thirty-legislative-day layover so long as the D.C. mayor does not veto
the act within ten days of its passage. Id. at § 1-206.02(c)(1). Congress may
disapprove a measure by passing a concurrent resolution to defeat it. Id.
173
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2. The Human Rights Act: A History of Prioritizing the
Eradication of Government-Sanctioned Discrimination
The Human Rights Act in the District of Columbia is not only
significant to the holding in Jackson, but critical to understanding the
policy priorities in the District. The District’s historical prioritization
of human rights is evidenced by the adoption of the Human Rights
179
Safeguard.
The pre-Home Rule Council adopted the first
manifestation of the Human Rights Act in 1973, as Title thirty-four of
180
the D.C. Rules and Regulations, known as the “Human Rights Law.”
On June 16, 1977, members of the Council of the District of
Columbia introduced the “Human Rights Act of 1977,” Bill-2-179, by
which the Council intended to codify the Human Rights Law to make
181
it a permanent part of the District Of Columbia Code.
The
Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs Chairperson,
John A. Wilson, reported that the codification of the Human Rights
Law would serve three primary purposes: (1) to remove any questions
“as to certain provisions of Title thirty-four because of its present
status as a police regulation issued by the pre-Home Rule city
government;” (2) to reinforce the Council’s stance that the Act was
among the District’s “most important laws” and was to be “vigorously
enforced by all agencies and officials” of D.C. government; and (3) to
assure that licensing laws and other provisions of the code are
182
interpreted and enforced to give full effect to the provision.
To
resolve concerns, the Council enacted the Human Rights Act of 1977,
183
which put the Human Rights Law on “firm legal footing” by
184
bestowing upon it “the increased dignity and force of a statute.”
With the codification of the preexisting Human Rights Law as
179

See generally D.C. Council Comm. on Pub. Serv. and Consumer Affairs Report,
B. 2-179, at 1 (July 5, 1977) [hereinafter 2-179 Report] (on file with author).
180
Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210, 217 (D.C. 2007) (citing 34 DCRR § 3.1)
(1973).
181
2-179 Report, supra note 179. The bill made no substantive changes to the
“Human Rights Law” as part of the then-current D.C. Rules and Regulations. Id.
182
Id.; see Blodgett, 930 A.2d at 217 (positing that the Council re-enacted the
Human Rights Law regulation as a statutory provision in order to give the Human
Rights Law the force and effect of a statute). With re-enactment of the Human
Rights Law, the Council hoped to both clarify the district’s commitment to the
protection of human rights and to facilitate the enforcement of the law in the postHome Rule district. Id. at 217–18.
183
2-179 Report, supra note 179.
184
Id. Furthermore, in the committee report, Chairman Wilson acknowledged
that several court cases had questioned the pre-Home Rule government’s authority
to enforce some of the provisions contained in Title 34. Id. at 2. The Chairman was
concerned about the efficacy and enforceability of the Human Rights Law in light of
various D.C. Court of Appeals decisions at the time. Id. at 5.
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the Human Rights Act, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to
185
eliminating discrimination in the District as “the highest priority.”
In this regard, the D.C. Code provides:
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in
enacting this chapter, to secure an end in the District of
Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than that
of individual merit, including, but not limited to,
discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status,
family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation,
genetic information, disability, source of income, status as a
victim of an intrafamily offense, and place of residence or
186
business.
i. The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter
Amendment Act of 1977
While one might think that a measure allowing for the ballot
initiative would be unrelated to human rights concerns, the District
187
of Columbia’s experience proves quite the opposite.
As discussed
in the previous section, the District of Columbia’s history of
188
sovereignty demonstrates a prioritization of human rights.
A
concern for the preservation of human rights is likewise evident
throughout the District of Columbia Council’s process to adopt the
189
direct initiative in the District. This prioritization would ensure that

185

Id. at 4.
D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (West 2001). The original, pre-Home Rule Human
Rights Act explicitly precluded discrimination based on the following categories:
“race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance,
sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical
handicap, source of income, and place of residence or business.” Jackson v. Dist. of
Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 97 (D.C. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1001 (2011). The Council has left the Human Rights Act largely unchanged
since 1977, but has amended it to include new classifications to the list of protected
categories. In Blodgett, the court enumerated the following amendments to the
original act: “‘[P]hysical handicap’ replaced with ‘disability,’ D.C. Law 10-129, 41
D.C.Reg. 2583 (June 28, 1994); ‘familial status’ added by D.C. Law 12-242, 46
D.C.Reg. 952 (April 20, 1999); ‘genetic information’ added by D.C. Law 15-263, 52
D.C.Reg. 237 (April 5, 2005); ‘gender identity or expression’ added by D.C. Law 1658, 53 D.C.Reg. 14 (March 8, 2006); ‘status as a victim of an intrafamily offense’
added by D.C. Law 16-273, 54 D.C.Reg. 18 (May 4, 2007).” Blodgett, 930 A.2d at 218
n.4.
187
See supra text accompanying notes 179–86; see infra text accompanying notes
201–27.
188
See supra text accompanying notes 179–86.
189
See infra text accompanying notes 201–27.
186
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the advent of the direct initiative would not mean the demise of
minority rights in the district.
The 1977 Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter
Amendment Act (“CAA”) authorized the initiative process for citizens
190
in the District of Columbia.
The District of Columbia’s original
Charter, as adopted in 1973, did not contain any initiative,
191
referendum, or recall procedures.
The Charter set forth an
192
Before
amendment procedure to allow for flexible governing.
submission to Congress for a layover period, the Council must pass a
proposed amendment and a majority of registered voters must ratify
193
it.
The process to adopt the CAA began in 1976, when D.C.
Council Member Julius W. Hobson, Sr., made the first serious
194
attempt to adopt an initiative procedure.
The Council passed the
CAA in 1977 and, following ratification by a majority of registered
voters on November 7, 1977, Congress approved the CAA as part of
195
the District’s Charter.
In a memorandum from Councilman-at-Large and bill sponsor,
Julius W. Hobson, to his fellow councilmembers, Councilman
Hobson heralded the CAA as the “only means through which the
people of the District of Columbia can participate directly in their
196
government.”
Councilman Hobson further described the impetus
for the CAA: in the post-Watergate atmosphere of the time, publicopinion polls suggested that the public had become increasingly
suspicious of public officials and the traditional political process,
both of which were largely influenced by high-paid lobbyists and
197
special interests.
Section 1(a) of the CAA defines “initiative” as a “process by
which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws
(except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws
directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia
198
for their approval or disapproval.”
The CAA became effective on
March 10, 1978, following concurrent resolution by the Senate and
190

Jackson, 999 A.2d 89, 96 (discussing 24 D.C. Reg. 199 (July 8, 1977)).
Id.
192
See D.C. CODE § 1-203.03 (West 2001).
193
Id.
194
SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 228.
195
Hessey v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 601 A.2d 3, 12 (D.C. 1991).
196
Memorandum from Julius Hobson, Councilman-at-Large, D.C. Council, to all
Councilmembers 1 (Jan. 3. 1977) [hereinafter Jan. 1977 Memo] (on file with
author).
197
Id. at 3.
198
D.C. CODE § 1-204.101 (West 2001).
191
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199

House of Representatives.
As adopted, the CAA was not selfexecuting, and did not include specific procedures to ensure its
200
implementation.
ii. The Human Rights Act as a Safeguard Embedded in the
Initiative Process
The CAA authorized the D.C. Council to adopt implementing
201
legislation.
As codified, the CAA provided the Council with the
authority to adopt acts “necessary to carry out the purpose of this
202
subpart within 180 days of the effective date . . . .”
In addition to
adopting technical procedures to facilitate implementation, the
Council promptly debated a proposal to substantively limit the scope
203
of initiative issues by “tie-barring” the Human Rights Act to the
204
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 (“IPA”).
Prior to inclusion, the Council extensively debated incorporating the
205
Human Rights Act. Ultimately, in June 1979, the Council approved
implementing legislation, the IPA, which included the Human Rights
206
Act Safeguard.
Nationwide
events implicating gay
rights occurring
simultaneously with the Council’s decision to include the Human
Rights Safeguard in the IPA undoubtedly played a role in the
Council’s deliberations. This influence is evidenced by the Jackson
court noting that “recent events would have afforded the Council
good reason to anticipate that an initiative or referendum that would
have the effect of authorizing discrimination could be a threat to the
207
peace and to life and limb.”
In June 1977, activist and evangelist
Anita Bryant led a successful campaign to repeal a Dade County,
Florida ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on an
199

D.C. Council Comm. on Gov’t Operations Report, B. 3-2, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1979)
[hereinafter 3-2 Report] (on file with author).
200
Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A. 2d 89, 96–97 (D.C. 2010).
201
Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 399 A.2d
550, 551 (D.C. 1979).
202
D.C. CODE § 1-204.107 (2012).
203
Tie-barring is a legislative tactic by which one bill is written to correspond to,
or be read in tandem with, a provision in another bill or statute.
204
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 97.
205
See D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, B. 2-317, 2–11. (May 3, 1978)
[hereinafter 2-317 Report] (on file with author). The legislative history, legal
background, and public commentary surrounding the adoption of the IPA are
evidence that the Council extensively debated the inclusion of the Human Rights
Act.
206
Id.
207
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 112 n.44.
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208

individual’s sexual orientation.
Bryant’s campaign incited violent
209
clashes between the opponents and proponents of the campaign.
Bryant’s efforts to repeal the sexual orientation anti-discrimination
ordinance in Dade County marked the first wave of anti-gay
210
initiatives.
Contemporaneously, California State Senator John
Briggs successfully led a campaign to place Proposition 6 on the
211
ballot, which, if passed, would have severely limited the rights of
212
The court in
homosexual public school teachers in the state.
Jackson reasoned that, at the time the Council included the Human
Rights Act in the IPA, recent events gave the Council good reason to
anticipate that the direct initiative could be used to threaten civil
rights and, therefore, that the Council had grounds to cautiously
213
incorporate the Human Rights Safeguard into the IPA.
This heightened awareness of the prevalence of anti-gay and
anti-lesbian social campaigns is evident in the legislative history of the
IPA; interest groups’ support also weighed into the Council’s
214
deliberations.
As the D.C. Court of Appeals noted, many
individuals who testified before the Council’s Committee on
Government Operations expressed support for the adoption of the
215
Human Rights Safeguard as a part of the implementing legislation.
Importantly, the Gay Activists Alliance of Washington, D.C. and other
citizens participated in the public hearings and deliberations,
providing materials expressing support for the human rights
216
exception from the right to the initiative. Prior to the committee’s
public hearing on the IPA, the staff “received myriad telephone calls”
supporting an amendment that would limit initiatives promoting
217
discrimination. Given the record of support for the inclusion of the
Human Rights Act, one can fairly infer the connection that the
Jackson court expressly drew between the heightened attention to the
218
first wave of anti-gay and anti-lesbian initiatives and the Council’s
incorporation of the Human Rights Safeguard in the IPA.
208

Id.
Id.
210
Adams, supra note 93, at 606.
211
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 94.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 4–6.
215
Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 97 (D.C. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
216
See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 4–5.
217
Id. at 5.
218
Adams, supra note 93, at 606.
209
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219

Reitman v. Mulkey also played a prominent role in the Council’s
deliberations on limiting the scope of the electorate’s authority to
220
directly legislate through initiative.
Reitman was a landmark
221
decision.
Proposition 14, the California initiative at issue in
Reitman, forbade the state from abridging the rights of an individual
222
Its
to sell or not to sell his or her property as he or she chose.
drafters designed Proposition 14 to overturn state laws that
prohibited the practice of housing discrimination involving the state
affirmatively endorsing racial discrimination related to property
223
rights.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Supreme
Court of California’s decision to invalidate Proposition 14 as violative
224
The
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Council’s Committee on Government Operations reasoned that
Reitman turned on whether the state could allow an initiative that
affirmatively promoted discrimination as a matter of law, not whether
225
the initiative violated a constitutional right.
The Committee
determined that “the initiative process may not be used to place the
government in the posture of affirmatively condoning
discrimination” and that an initiative stripping the government of
226
“neutrality toward protected minority classifications” must fail.
Reflecting on the framework of Reitman, the Committee on
Government Operations concluded that to establish an initiative and
referendum procedure that allowed for discrimination “would
involve the District government in condoning and assisting with
227
discrimination.”
3. Background and Facts of the Case
The D.C. Court of Appeals considered Jackson at a time of
228
tremendous conflict over gay rights in the District of Columbia. In
2009, the District of Columbia Council passed two statutes promoting
same-sex marriage: the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009
229
(“JAMA”) and the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

387 U.S. 369 (1967).
2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 10–11.
Id.
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370–71.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 370–71.
2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 10.
Id. at 9.
Jackson v. D.C. Board of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 112 (D.C. 2010).
See id. at 93.
Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 46-405.01 (2009)).
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230

Amendment Act of 2009.
The Council’s approval of same-sex
marriage provoked action by citizens opposed to same-sex marriage,
231
The
leading to the proposal of the “Marriage Initiative of 2009.”
232
Jackson court considered the validity of this initiative. In May 2009,
the District of Columbia Council passed the JAMA, which recognized
the validity of same-sex marriages entered into in other
233
jurisdictions.
In an effort to undo the effects of JAMA, on
September 1, 2009, appellants filed a proposed initiative, the
“Marriage Initiative of 2009,” with the District of Columbia Board of
234
Elections and Ethics (“Board”).
Appellants proposed an initiative
aimed to amend Title 46, Subtitle I, Chapter 4 of the D.C. Code
(“Code”) to state: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is
235
valid or recognized in the District of Columbia.” During the course
of the Jackson proceedings, the D.C. Council adopted the Religious
Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009
(“Marriage Equality Act”), which expanded the legal definition of
236
marriage in D.C. to provide for same-sex marriages.
It became
237
effective as D.C. Law 18-110 on March 3, 2010. The passage of the
Marriage Initiative Act therefore would have nullified both JAMA and
238
the Marriage Equality Act.
The D.C. Code permits the Board to reject a proposed initiative
if it finds that the measure is “not a proper subject of initiative or
239
referendum.” The Code explicitly outlines what types of measures
are improper, requiring the Board to reject any measure that
230

Id. (citing 57 D.C. Reg. 1833 (Mar. 5, 2010)).
Id.
232
Id.
233
D.C. CODE § 46-405.01 (2010).
234
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93.
235
Id. The language proposed in the initiative is the standard text for a Defense
of Marriage Act. Nevertheless, this version was milder than other acts in that it did
not repeal previously recognized same-sex marriages. See ANDREW KOPPLEMAN, SAME
SEX, DIFFERENT STATES 137–48 (2006). Koppleman explains that many states adopted
“mini-DOMA” statutes in three waves in response to the progress of the same-sex
marriage movement. Id. at 137. The first wave occurred in 1970s following a few
lawsuits filed by same-sex couples seeking the right to marry, while the second phase
occurred in the 1990s following the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court case Baehr v. Lewin,
leading many opponents to worry that the state would soon recognize same-sex
marriage. Id. at 137–138; see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The final
wave occurred in the 2000s, following the Massachusetts and Vermont State Supreme
Court decisions constitutionally mandating the recognition of same-sex marriage. Id.
at 138.
236
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93.
237
Id.
238
See id.
239
D.C. CODE § 1-1001.16(b)(1) (2012).
231
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“authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination
240
prohibited under [the Human Rights Act].” After a public hearing
on October 26, 2009, the Board rejected the Marriage Initiative Act,
finding that it was not a proper subject of initiative under the CAA
241
because it had the effect of authorizing discrimination. The Board
concluded that “[w]hile neither the HRA nor its legislative history
explicitly mentions same-sex marriage, it is without question that the
HRA must ‘be read broadly to eliminate the many proscribed forms
242
of discrimination in the District.’”
Appellants, following the
applicable procedures, then sought a writ of mandamus requesting
243
that the D.C. Superior Court review and certify the initiative. The
Superior Court found in favor of the District, holding that the
Human Rights Act is a valid limitation on the initiative process and
244
that the Marriage Initiative of 2009 would authorize discrimination.
245
An appeal followed the Superior Court’s ruling.
4. The D.C. Court of Appeals’ Holding and Analysis
Before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, appellants
argued that the Human Rights Safeguard of the IPA improperly
expanded the Council’s authority under the CAA, and therefore the
246
Council lacked the authority to reject appellants’ initiative.
To
provide historical context, the court observed that a comparison to
other jurisdictions’ initiative mechanisms would not be constructive
240

§ 1-1001.16(b)(1)(C).
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93.
242
Marriage Initiative of 2009, No. 09-006 11 (D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics Nov.
17, 2009) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (quoting Dean v. District of
Columbia,
653
A.2d
307,
320
(D.C.
1995)),
available
at
http://www.dcboee.org/popup.asp?url=/pdf_files/09006.pdf. In Dean v. District of
Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a decision denying a
same-sex couple a marriage license. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307
(D.C. 1995). The court found that the District of Columbia’s marriage statute did
not include same-sex marriages despite being written to be gender-neutral, that
denying the license did not violate the Human Rights Act, and that denying the
license did not violate the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 309. The Board found Dean
instructive in that Dean clarified that a court must look to the legislative history,
current statutory context, and legislative intent when determining whether a
particular form of discrimination is proscribed by the HRA. Marriage Initiative of
2009, No. 09-006 11 at 10–11. Unlike when Dean was decided, when the Board was
deliberating, the Council had already enacted JAMA. Therefore, it held that denying
couples who fall within JAMA’s purview the same benefits afforded heterosexual
married couples would contravene the HRA. Id.
243
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93.
244
Id. at 94.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 99.
241
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247

because of the unique nature of D.C.’s governmental structure.
Moreover, as the District of Columbia is its own distinct jurisdiction,
any comparison is merely instructive. In the states, the people retain
certain authority for themselves by granting power to the legislature
248
through the ratification process.
In the District of Columbia,
however, Congress granted legislative authority to the Council, and,
through the CAA, the Council has granted certain power to its
249
residents.
Essential to the court’s determination of whether the
Human Rights Act Safeguard was a valid limitation on the people’s
right to avail themselves of the initiative process was establishing the
intent of the Council when enacting the CAA to share certain
250
legislative power with the electorate.
Considering this question, the court focused on the legislative
history of the HRA and, more specifically, on the District’s
progressive tradition of being at the forefront of human rights and
251
anti-discrimination legislation.
A co-sponsor of the HRA,
Councilmember Rolark, publicly testified about the importance of
the HRA in light of the hard-fought battle for rights for all of the
252
District’s citizens. Historically, the District of Columbia has housed
253
a predominately minority population; the Council’s awareness of
the significance of minority rights, or lack thereof, undoubtedly
254
played a role in its deliberations.
The court found that the HRA Safeguard was not contrary to the
255
purpose of the CAA, and that it would be inconceivable for the
Council to adopt the CAA in a form that would allow the public to
256
circumvent the HRA.
Moreover, the court held that the Council
had the authority to direct the Board to review the subject matter of a
proposed initiative prior to an election to determine if the initiative
257
addresses a proper subject matter.
The court further agreed with

247

Id. at 101.
Id.
249
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 100–01.
250
Id. at 100.
251
Id. at 110.
252
Id.
253
See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA QUICKFACTS FROM THE
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
/11000.html. While African-Americans comprise 12.6% of the U.S. population,
African Americans make up 50.7% of the District of Columbia’s population. Id.
254
See Jackson, 999 A.2d at 110.
255
Id. at 106.
256
Id. at 110.
257
Id. at 115.
248
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the Board that the initiative would have the effect of discriminating
258
based on sexual orientation. In so ruling, the court focused closely
259
The Council’s Committee on
on the CAA’s legislative history.
Government Operations Report reveals the legislative intent behind
the adoption of the CAA, noting that, “the initiative, referendum,
and recall political processes are designed to provide direct and
260
continual accountability of public officials to the electorate.”
The
court reasoned that if the broad purpose of the CAA is to provide for
the accountability of the elected to the electorate, then the Council
could reasonably have intended that this measure was necessary to
fulfill that purpose: “the purpose of helping to ensure that the
261
The Council’s
Council was accountable to the entire electorate.”
intention was to proscribe the use of the initiative “to enact
legislation that would have the effect of discriminating against sectors
of the electorate who might need protection” from threats of
262
discrimination.
In affirming the district court’s ruling that the HRA safeguard in
the IPA was consistent with the CAA’s intent, the D.C. Court of
Appeals pointed to the Committee on Government Operations’
reliance on Supreme Court Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Reitman
263
v. Mulkey.
In Reitman, Justice Douglas responded to the argument
that Proposition 14 represented the will of the people by quoting
James Madison, who warned about the necessity of protecting
minorities from the “acts in which the Government is the mere
264
instrument of the major number of the Constituents.” Focusing on
Madison’s teachings, Justice Douglas suggested that the will of the
majority is not only an insufficient justification to condone a
discriminatory policy, but that the will of the majority constitutes an
especially powerful danger that can lead to oppression without
265
proper resistance.
To allow the will of the majority to oppress
others in the community is tantamount to government-sanctioned
266
Therefore, the Committee on Government
discrimination.
258

Id. at 116.
D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS REPORT, B. 2-2, 2–3 (Mar. 16,
1977) [hereinafter 2-2 Report] (on file with author).
260
Id.
261
Jackson, 999 A.2d at 105.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 105 n.27 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
264
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387 (Douglas, J., concurring).
265
Id.
266
See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9.
259
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Operations concluded that “[t]he teaching of Reitman is that the
initiative process may not be used to place the Government in the
267
posture of affirmatively condoning discrimination.”
In summary, the court concluded that the Council did not
contravene its authority under the CAA and the HRA when it
268
adopted the Human Rights Safeguard of the IPA. Finding that the
proposed Marriage Initiative Act of 2009 would authorize
discrimination proscribed under the HRA, the appellate court agreed
with the district court that the Board properly determined that the
269
initiative was invalid.
The advantageous effects of the Human Rights Safeguard are
evident in the Jackson decision. Before one can assess whether the
Human Rights Act Safeguard is a desirable component of the
initiative process, it is instructive to first examine other regulatory
methods that other jurisdictions currently use in the direct
democracy process.
IV. CURRENT METHODS UTILIZED TO REGULATE DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Jurisdictions across the nation employ various methods to
regulate the direct democratic process, but no jurisdiction has a
method as substantively comprehensive as the District of Columbia’s
270
Human Rights Safeguard. This section will assess various measures
that jurisdictions use to regulate the initiative process. First, many
jurisdictions implement pre-election legislative and administrative
271
review of proposed initiatives.
Some jurisdictions also use subjectmatter restrictions on the right to use the initiative as a means of
272
regulating the content of proposed initiatives.
Nevertheless, no
other jurisdiction proscribes all initiatives infringing upon any
273
human rights, as does the District of Columbia.
Finally, this part
will evaluate the efficacy of judicial review to temper the initiative
process. This section will not argue that current methods to regulate
the initiative process are ill-founded. Rather, this section will suggest
that the current methods are insufficient to regulate the initiative

267

Id.
Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2001).
269
Id.; see generally Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, No. 2009 CA 008613
B, 2010 WL 171913 (D.C. Super. Jan. 14, 2010).
270
See, e.g., infra text and notes accompanying Parts IV.A–C.
271
See, e.g., infra text and notes accompanying Part IV.A.
272
See infra text accompanying notes 291–97.
273
Id.
268
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process to protect minority rights. As such, further regulation is
necessary. To that end, the Human Rights Safeguard, though an
outlier in practice, is a valuable reform measure that other
jurisdictions ought to adopt to ensure that direct democracy does not
274
lead to oppression by the many of the few.
A. Pre-Election Legislative and Administrative Review
State legislatures that have authorized an indirect initiative
275
procedure generally hold hearings to discuss a proposal.
This
process serves as an opportunity to educate the legislators and public
276
about the implications of adopting a proposal.
California is the
only state that uses a direct initiative that formally requires a
legislative hearing, even though the legislature has no authority to
277
change the proposed initiative.
While informative, these hearings
278
There are no
generally do not garner public or media attention.
studies that discuss the extent to which these hearings and
subsequent reports are later used, but it does not appear that these
hearings impact the overall discourse concerning the initiative
279
process.
In most states, the official who conducts the pre-election
administrative review of a proposal is not authorized to review its
280
legality under state and federal law. The official merely reviews the
initiative’s format and the sufficiency of the signature-gathering
281
Seven states authorize regulatory oversight with greater
process.
282
review powers.
None approach the breadth of the District of
Columbia’s review to ensure that an initiative does not contravene
283
the broad range of rights protected under the Human Rights Act.
274

See generally 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9.
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 42; see supra Part II.A for a discussion on
the difference between an indirect and a direct initiative. While the indirect
initiative must be submitted to the legislature for approval, a direct initiative is
submitted directly to the electorate for approval or disapproval.
276
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 42.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 39.
281
Id.
282
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 39–40. Alaska, Arkansas, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah authorize various methods of review that have
more regulatory bite than the other states. Id. Additionally, seven jurisdictions,
including the District of Columbia, provide for some form of drafting review. Id. at
42.
283
Id. at 39.
275
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For instance, in Massachusetts, prior to a petition’s circulation, the
Attorney General has the authority to preliminarily review a proposal
to ensure that the measure does not include any matters that are
284
excluded from the initiative process by the state’s constitution.
Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Attorney General is not authorized to
review the constitutionality or validity of the proposal, but must
certify only that the proposal facially conforms to the explicit
requirements and subject-matter exclusions set forth in the state’s
constitution even when there are other constitutionality concerns
285
outside the precise restrictions on the initiative process.
The
exclusion of certain subjects restricts the right to utilize the initiative
process, but is not nearly as all-encompassing as the Human Rights
286
Safeguard.
Specifically, the Attorney General will not certify a
petition that relates to matters concerning the following: religion and
religious institutions; judges and the court; local government; and
287
specific appropriations of money. Accordingly, a petition related to
the rights of gays and lesbians would not be precluded under the
288
Therefore, even if the Attorney
Massachusetts Constitution.
General questioned the constitutionality of such a provision, the
Attorney General would still be obligated to certify the petition if it
289
conforms to the other requirements.

284

Alexander Gray, Jr. & Thomas Kiley, The Initiative and Referendum in
Massachusetts, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 29 (1991); see MASS. CONST. amend. art.
XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2. While review of proposed initiatives is more comprehensive in
Massachusetts than in most jurisdictions, Massachusetts does not proscribe a human
rights violation in its initiative procedure. Moreover, in Mississippi, the state
department makes advisory recommendations regarding the language of the
initiative, which the sponsor of the initiative can either accept or reject. INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESSES 8,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%2
0Boxes/Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%20I&R%20Processes
.pdf. While twelve states require some form of pre-election review regarding
language, content or constitutionality, in all but four of these states, the results of the
review are advisory only. Id.
285
Gray & Kiley, supra note 284, at 40–41; see MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII,
pt. 2, § 3 (outlines the criterion for the Attorney General’s certification).
286
See MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2.
287
Id.
288
See id.
289
Gray & Kiley, supra note 284, at 40–41; see MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII,
pt. 2, § 3 (outlining the criterion for the Attorney General’s certification).
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B. Subject-Matter Restrictions
Most states’ initiative processes include some type of restriction
290
on the use of the initiative.
The most common restriction is the
“single-subject rule,” which limits the subject matter of a proposal to
291
one certain area of change. Similarly, four states enforce a waiting
292
period for reintroducing a measure that previously failed.
Moreover, all states forbid an initiative to address an issue that is
293
beyond the purview of the state legislature. Alaska, Massachusetts,
and Wyoming prohibit initiatives creating courts or otherwise
294
impacting the judicial process.
In this regard, Mississippi and
295
Massachusetts go further than other states in limiting initiatives.
Massachusetts excludes any initiative broaching religious issues, as
well as initiatives limiting the right to free speech, to trial by jury, to
just compensation for property takings, and to court access;
Mississippi prohibits initiatives that would impact its state
296
constitution’s Bill of Rights and right to work guarantee.
Both
Mississippi and Massachusetts prohibit an initiative that would change
297
the initiative process itself. In sum, while states have implemented
some limitations on the right to employ the initiative process, no state
has a restriction that mirrors the District of Columbia’s Human
298
Rights Safeguard.
C. Judicial Review: A Crucial Component of the Initiative Process
While courts play an important role in the effective functioning
of the initiative process, the function of the courts proves insufficient
in protecting the rights of minorities whose liberties are put to a
majority vote. Generally, the courts become engaged in the initiative
process only after a majority of voters have approved an initiative, as
the courts must interpret and enforce initiatives that the jurisdiction’s
299
electorate has approved.
Courts generally are reluctant to review
290

See text accompanying notes 270–72.
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 81.
292
Id. at 82.
293
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, supra note 284, at 13.
294
Id.
295
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 82.
296
Id.; see MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. 15, §273(5).
297
Id.
298
See supra text accompanying notes 201–27.
299
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43. Additionally, courts are sometimes
called upon to determine whether the procedural requirements for submission or
adoption have been satisfied, whether the initiative falls within the jurisdiction’s
specified subject-matter limitations, see supra text accompanying notes 291–98 or
291
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substantive constitutional challenges prior to election. There also is
concern that pre-election judicial review can slow down the initiative
process and place the judiciary in the middle of a contentious
301
political debate.
Nevertheless, one could argue that pre-election
judicial review is more efficient, as resources and energies could be
reserved at the front end of the process, before any campaign or vote
302
ever takes place.
Furthermore, many scholars argue for broader
judicial scrutiny, because the traditional vetting and deliberation
process inherent in the legislative process is generally absent in the
303
direct initiative process.
Most jurisdictions allow pre-election judicial review concerning
issues of procedural compliance, while about half of jurisdictions
allow pre-election judicial review for questions about whether the
subject matter of a proposal complies with subject-matter
304
restrictions.
Still, as courts generally are reluctant to review
questions of constitutionality prior to an initiative’s placement on the
305
ballot, ballot measures implicating the rights of minorities will
306
routinely go on the ballot without review by the judiciary.
Legal
scholar and former jurist Hans Linde warns of the increased
likelihood of direct initiatives “to enact ordinary laws . . . in the form
of constitutional text so as to insulate a law from change by elected
307
lawmakers as well as from review of its constitutionality.”
Most
scholars agree that direct initiatives ought not to be insulated from
whether the initiative is valid under the federal or state constitutions. DUBOIS &
FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43.
300
Id.
301
Id. Because a majority of jurisdictions require that a statewide initiative be
placed on the general election ballot, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, supra
note 284, at 22, pre-election judicial review has the potential to delay the
consideration of an initiative depending on the point at which the initiative is
considered in the election cycle and exacerbate timing issues.
302
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43.
303
Ronald Steiner, Understanding the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy
and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 81, 82 (2009).
304
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43.
305
Id.
306
For the purposes of further explaining the deficiencies of the current practice
of judicial review, it is important to note that prior to the approval of Proposition 8,
the petitioners in the case of Strauss v. Horton sought a stay of the initiative or, in the
alternative, injunctive relief pending judicial review in November 2008. See Strauss v.
Horton, No. S168047, 2008 WL 5516861, at *2, *7 (Cal. Nov. 7, 2008). Nevertheless,
the Court did not issue a decision as to the validity of Proposition 8 until May 2009,
after the approval by a majority of voters on November 4, 2008. Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009).
307
Hans Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
709, 710 (1994).
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scrutiny and that courts should inspect ballot initiatives with greater
308
vigor than ordinary legislative measures. Without change or other
safeguards, such as the Human Rights Safeguard, the will of the
majority remains a threat to minority interests.
Moreover, even when ballot measures are ultimately reviewed,
309
the courts apply inconsistent standards of review.
Scholars
complain about the divergent manner in which courts review ballot
310
Federal and state courts, for example, use varying
measures.
311
standards.
Furthermore, while some courts apply a more
deferential standard of review, reasoning that a direct initiative comes
directly from the people, other courts apply a stricter level of
312
scrutiny.
To combat the harmful majoritarianism that initiatives
pose, scholars argue that courts should preemptively and stringently
313
enforce constitutional protections and technical requirements.
Because the structural protections of checks and balances inherent in
the ordinary legislative process are absent in the direct initiative
314
process, compelling reasons exist for stricter review of direct
initiatives.
V. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PRE-ELECTION REVIEW AND JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT SAFEGUARD AS A MODEL FOR
REFORM
As current and customary methods used to regulate the direct
initiative process reveal, the Human Rights Safeguard is an outlier
and is otherwise unprecedented in every other jurisdiction in this
315
country. Nevertheless, while unique in practice, the Human Rights
Safeguard embodies an essential tool to mitigate the threat of
oppression. Other jurisdictions ought to follow the District of
Columbia and adopt similar reforms.
A. A Political Philosophical Justification for Reform
Regulating direct democracy poses a particular challenge
precisely because it is antithetical to the American form of

308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

Steiner, supra note 303, at 90.
See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1.
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 27.
Id.
Id.
Adams, supra note 93, at 628.
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 296.
See supra Parts IV.A–C.
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316

government.
As Erwin Chemerinsky notes, the structure of the
317
United States Constitution is largely guided by distrust of majorities.
The debate about the power that the people should properly hold in
318
a modern democracy is as old as government itself.
Scholars and
leaders have struggled to find a balance between self-government and
319
Thomas
fair and equal representation of all of society’s voices.
Jefferson, whose philosophy many proponents of direct democracy
revere, proposed the ideology that government is invalid unless
320
founded upon the will of the people. Town hall-style government,
under which everyone gathers to discuss and debate policy, while
perhaps ideal, certainly is impractical in an expansive and diverse
nation: “In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is
321
impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws.”
Political thinkers have long posited theories cautioning against
322
the government by the will of majority factions.
While a
government may well be founded upon the will of the people, the
government also must be constructed to rein in that will when
necessary and appropriate. James Madison, architect of the United
States Constitution, warned of the need for establishing checks and
balances to protect the governed from the proclivities of human
nature: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
323
government would be necessary.”
Eschewing the notion of true
direct democracy, Madison and his peers determined that, while
elected representatives should be sensitive to the governed, regular
elections served as a sufficient measure to ensure that officials were
attuned to the wishes of the people, and, accordingly, America would
324
function under a republican democracy. The founders structured a
representative democracy devoid of a national right to create laws via
325
popular initiative.
316

Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 294.
Id. at 295.
318
Id.
319
See CRONIN, supra note 24, at 18–20.
320
Id. at 40.
321
John Adams, quoted in CRONIN, supra note 24, at 14 (discussing John Adams,
Thoughts on Government (1776)).
322
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 296. Chemerinsky argues that the
framers’ support of representative democracy did not result from elitism, but from
the framers’ study of history and of their well-founded fear of the tyranny of
consolidated power in government. Id. at 295.
323
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
324
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 8.
325
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 295. Chemerinsky also notes that the framers
317
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The founders’ wariness of direct democracy stemmed from their
fear of the tyranny of the majority, especially in regard to minority
326
rights oppressed by the will and fancy of the politically powerful. A
healthy fear of tyranny of the majority has remained a constant
consideration from America’s beginning and certainly remains
327
today. From the founding of this nation, the pervasive struggle to
find the proper balance between effective government and individual
rights and liberties has plagued both the governors and the
328
governed.
Ultimately, the framers drafted the Constitution to
ensure that no institution could assume a concentration of power by
“(i) investing primary lawmaking authority in representatives rather
than the people themselves; (ii) dividing the power of the lawmakers
so that each unit may check the others; and (iii) placing certain
329
principles beyond the reach of ordinary majorities.”
Direct
democratic procedures, such as the direct ballot initiative, serve to
break down this wall, allowing ordinary majorities to affect principles
330
not otherwise alterable by popular will.
While the framers of the Constitution purposefully created an
indirect democracy—a republican democracy—the use of, and
331
campaign for, direct democracy dates back to the English settlers.
This campaign has resurfaced throughout American history, as seen
in the Populist and Progressive Movements, and again in the 1970s
332
through today. While this nation has progressed from an emerging
republic to an established and powerful democracy, jurisdictions
utilizing direct democracy would be well advised not to forget the
lessons of the founding fathers. Casting aside the founders’
experience risks violence to the liberties upon which this country was
established.
As Magleby notes, the issue of checks and balances in direct
democratic processes is particularly important when dealing with
333
measures targeting minority groups.
By the very nature of direct
legislation, campaigns “appeal to passions and prejudices, spotlight
would have strongly condemned a national plebiscite and that direct democracy is
inconsistent with the structure and philosophy of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 294–
95.
326
See CRONIN, supra note 24, at 19.
327
Id. at 90.
328
See id. at 21.
329
Eule, supra note 22, at 1549.
330
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3.
331
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 1.
332
See supra Parts II.B–C.
333
Magleby, supra note 6, at 45.
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tensions, and may foster even greater conflict and disagreement.”
While there has always existed a tension between the will of the
electorate and the potential for tyranny and oppression, political
leaders and thinkers historically have tempered this tension through
335
representative governmental structures. The introduction of direct
democratic practices, as has been established, has reinforced this
persistent tension, and therefore is more properly addressed through
regulatory reform.
B. Initiatives Addressing Same-Sex Marriage: A Compelling Argument
for Reform
Professor Adam Morse proposes that “initiatives addressing
same-sex marriage provide an ideal case study for balancing the
336
political rights of minority groups with those of the majority.”
Ballot initiatives aimed at defining marriage as between opposite-sex
couples have the effect of rendering gays and lesbians second-class
citizens, and raise serious questions about the rights of political
337
participation in the United States. A significant issue that remains
unaddressed is whether gays and lesbians fall precisely within the
suspect classification characterized in footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Company: “whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
338
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”
Nevertheless,
334

Id. at 44.
See generally CRONIN, supra note 24, at 8–9.
336
Morse, supra note 7, at 963.
337
Id.
338
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The
debate about whether gays and lesbians qualify as a suspect class highlights the fact
that the legal status of this group is in flux. Many current court decisions and
political and scholarly debates focus on the issue of the legal protections gays and
lesbians should be afforded. Such discussions will not be examined in detail, but it is
nonetheless important to highlight the current uncertainty surrounding this ongoing
debate. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010);
see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (finding a state constitutional
right to same-sex marriage under the equal protection clause); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney
General, the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011
/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter “Holder Letter”]. The Attorney General
Eric Holder notified the House Speaker John Boehner that sexual orientation
should receive heightened scrutiny, and therefore declared his opinion that the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional as applied to legally married
same-sex couples. He further stated that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal
335
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initiatives addressing same-sex marriage raise critical concerns
regarding the interplay between minority and majority political rights
in part because gays and lesbians are a minority group that the
339
federal courts have yet to identify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
The initiative process allows individuals harboring “animus
towards disempowered minorities to make careless and unexamined
decisions without ever enduring a sustained confrontation with the
individuals who stand to lose a great deal as a direct result of their
340
voting decisions.” Any philosophical rationale for giving deference
to ballot initiatives targeting vulnerable minorities seems
constitutionally unwarranted, and appears contrary to the original
341
intellectual justifications for the process of direct democracy.
Proponents of such measures frequently supply misinformation,
342
which offsets any educative advantage of direct democracy. The use
of these proposals does not merely provide an alternative to the
republican democracy, but can supplant it by weakening the power of
343
elected officials to consider these issues.
Furthermore, the use of
initiatives in this area “demonstrate[s] the problems of permitting
344
voters to contemplate complex, emotionally charged issues.”
Without proper checks and balances, the majority can, will, and
already has subjugated minority rights through the use of ballot
345
initiatives.
The town hall ideal does not accurately reflect reality,
and without proper limitations, direct democracy threatens the
balance that the founders deliberately wove into the Constitution.
C. Judicial Review as a Necessary but Insufficient Safeguard Against
Discrimination
Responding to the criticism that initiatives lead to a tyranny of
the majority, scholar David D. Schmidt argues that lawmaking by
popular vote cannot lead to such tyranny in part because
constitutional initiatives are subject to federal judicial review and

protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Further, the Attorney General
invited the Speaker to defend the constitutionality of DOMA because the President
and his administration could not and would not defend DOMA. The importance of
this letter cannot be understated.
339
Morse, supra note 7, at 963.
340
Smith, supra note 17, at 545.
341
Adams, supra note 93, at 601.
342
Id. at 602.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
See supra text accompanying notes 97–117.
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therefore must conform to the United States Constitution.
Nevertheless, same-sex couples continue to be the target of successful
initiative campaigns throughout the country and judicial review has
347
not proven to be a sufficient safeguard.
Until recently, gays and
lesbians have not been deemed to be a suspect or quasi-suspect
348
Accordingly, judicial review of ballot measures is simply an
class.
349
insufficient safeguard in all cases.
Eule argues that the judiciary must play a larger role in reviewing
measures adopted by initiative because of the absence of the filtering
system inherent in representative democracy; consequently, “the
judiciary stands alone in guarding against the evils incident to
transient, impassioned majorities that the Constitution seeks to
350
dissipate.” Eule further proposes that where the people choose to
eschew representation, as with the use of the direct initiative, the
courts must step in to “protect the Constitution’s representational
351
values.” Under Eule’s reasoning, the courts should be suspicious of
and strictly scrutinize plebiscites that concern individual rights and
352
equal treatment under the law.
Nonetheless, some argue that the judiciary, deferential to
methods of direct democracy such as the ballot initiative, is
insufficient in fully protecting minority rights from majority political
353
action.
Moreover, empirical research suggests that both state and
federal courts are inconsistent in their approach to judicial review of
354
ballot initiatives. While some courts apply a strict standard, others
355
This concern is
are more deferential to the initiatives.
compounded by the problem of federal courts sometimes applying
356
different standards than state courts. Therefore, greater uniformity
in judicial review on the state and federal level is necessary to protect
346

SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 37.
See Ballotwatch, Election 2009, supra note 129; Sharples, supra note 122.
348
See Holder Letter, supra note 338.
349
This argument is not to suggest that judicial review is never sufficient to
protect minority interests. As is evident in the case of Reitman v. Mulkey, for instance,
the judiciary can serve as a watchdog for minority rights. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 378 (1967). Instead, I argue that because of inconstant standards of review
and the unpredictable application of the rational basis standard, the judiciary is an
insufficient safeguard.
350
Eule, supra note 22, at 1525.
351
Id. at 1559.
352
Id.
353
See Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
354
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 27.
355
Id.
356
Id.
347
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minorities from majority political action. Without proper review and
in the absence of safeguards, minorities remain vulnerable.
Moreover, while courts may strike down a measure affirmatively
promoting discrimination, the direct repeal of preexisting legal
357
protections may not trigger judicial intervention.
For example, in
the District of Columbia, the legislative history of the IPA reveals that
the Council was concerned that, in light of the Reitman holding, “the
mere repeal of an anti-discrimination statute might not be sufficient
358
to warrant judicial intervention.” While the distinction is nuanced,
it is also significant. Courts are more likely to strike down a ballot
initiative that imposes a policy of discrimination than one that repeals
an anti-discrimination civil rights protection that the legislature
359
previously enacted.
While courts likely will strike down
government-sanctioned discrimination, they may not nullify a
measure that “merely” repeals protections that the legislature
deemed necessary, so long as the initiative does not explicitly
promote discrimination.
Furthermore, one scholar has warned that so-called “initiative
elites,” a term used to identify individuals who are believed to have
professionalized the initiative process, have become frustrated with
the courts’ inconsistent and intervening role in the direct democratic
360
process. As Professor Matthew Manweller warns, if the courts serve
as the sole mechanism charged with the duty to maintain “Madison’s
system of minority protections,” they will frequently have to strike
361
down measures, ultimately leading to resistance.
Initiative elites
respond to the courts’ involvement in the initiative process in order
362
to protect their continued reliance on the autonomy of the process.
Moreover, initiative elites have become increasingly frustrated and
363
openly hostile to the courts. The initiative elites have pursued two
different courses of action to adapt to judicial intervention and
nullification: first, they have utilized the initiative process to restrict
364
the role of the judiciary in the process; second, they have attacked
357

Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9; see also Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
359
Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
360
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 209.
361
Id. at 209–10.
362
Id.
363
Id. at 194.
364
Id. For example, activist Don McIntire of Oregon drafted and qualified for
the 2002 ballot Measure 21 and 22, both as a result of what the sponsor believed to
be a too activist court. Measure 21 would have required that, in any judicial election,
an option of “None of the Above” must be listed on the ballot. If this option received
358
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the judiciary through the use of the recall or other tactics such as
365
For
influencing judicial election campaigns to unseat jurists.
instance, the recall of three Iowa Supreme Court justices after the
court’s unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage is a
366
testament to this argument.
Initiative elites also might bear the
burden of information costs in a judicial election in order to inform
the public about a decision of a particular jurist, either by drafting
367
candidates or by providing opposition research.
The initiative elites’ reactionary behavior likely will result in a
more politicized court and less confidence in the judiciary’s
368
impartiality and accountability.
While further discussion of this
potential phenomenon’s impact on the courts is beyond the scope of
this Comment, it is important to note that additional safeguards, such
as the Human Rights Safeguard, are essential to the protection of
minority rights in part because the courts are an insufficient
watchdog in the face of the ever-increasing use of ballot initiatives to
govern in the name of moral supremacy.
D. The Time for Reform
Nineteen of the twenty-five jurisdictions with an initiative
369
procedure in place adopted the initiative before 1919.
Since that
time, “there has been relatively little systematic review of the initiative
370
procedure.” While most states have kept their initiative procedures
in roughly the same form as when first adopted, the world has
371
changed considerably since then.
We undoubtedly still live in an
372
“era of real grievances.” Nevertheless, the issues of the day during
the Progressive years, social ills arising due to modernization and an
increased presence of government in one’s everyday life, are not the
same as many of today’s concerns, particularly the “family values”
more votes than any judge listed, a special election would be held. Id. at 204–05.
Even though this measure failed, such a measure may influence a judge the next
time he or she is presented with a challenged ballot initiative on the docket. Id. at
209.
365
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 194–95. Manweller notes that initiative elites
can do little to respond to federal courts that nullify initiatives, as federal judges are
appointed for life and are therefore largely insulated from political pressures. Id. at
196.
366
See Sulzberger, supra note 43.
367
MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 198–99, 209.
368
Id. at 210–11; see Sulzberger, supra note 43.
369
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 232–33.
370
Id.
371
Id. at 233.
372
CRONIN, supra note 24, at 6.
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issues typically targeted in modern ballot initiative campaigns.
Although states adopted initiative processes to combat powerful
political machinery and special interests and to ensure state
legislatures’ responsiveness to those they represent, in Strauss v.
Horton Justice Moreno found no evidence that the Progressives
intended to preclude the protection of vulnerable minorities from
373
the will of the majority.
There is a stark difference between
protecting against politically powerful minority groups and allowing
the majoritarian process to impede the rights of disfavored and
374
politically powerless minorities.
Yet, it is true that direct democracy is not purely a source of
oppression. The initiative has been and can continue to be a source
of positive political reform. For instance, women’s suffrage was a
375
target of early state initiatives.
Moreover, in Maryland and Maine,
ballot initiatives legalizing same-sex were passed by the majority of
376
But, despite the benefits that direct
voters in the 2012 election.
democracy provides, the initiative process continues to pose a serious
377
risk to minority groups. While some may argue that the mere act of
allowing civil rights to be put to a popular vote sharpens divisions in
378
society, ballot initiatives are a reality and the ever-increasing
utilization of ballot initiatives emphasizes the need for reform to
ensure that ballot initiatives do not strip away the rights of vulnerable
379
minorities.
373

Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 133 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
374
See id.
375
Magleby, supra note 6, at 45.
376
Election 2012: Same-Sex Marriage Passes in Maryland, Main, CNN WIRE (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/national/election-2012-same-sex-marriage
-passes-in-maryland-maine.
377
Adams, supra note 93, at 603.
378
See Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
379
For instance, as briefly discussed above, supra note 38, the authorization of
same-sex marriage, whether by legislative initiative or popular referendum, is a
controversial issue currently facing citizens and government officials in New Jersey.
Around the time of this writing, the New Jersey State Legislature passed legislation
authorizing gay marriage, while New Jersey Governor Chris Christie has vetoed any
such legislation. Kate Fernike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion
/christie-vetoes-gay-marriage-bill.html. Instead, the Governor proposed to put the
question to the voters as a popular referendum, publicly stating: “this is not an issue
that should rest solely in the hands of the Senate, or in the hands of the Speaker [of
the New Jersey General Assembly] or the other 118 members of the Legislature.
Let’s let the people of New Jersey decide what is right for the state.” Transcript: Gov.
Christie Speaks in Bridgewater on Gay Marriage, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Jan. 24, 2012,
available at http://www.app.com/article/20120124/NJNEWS10/301240066
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/TRANSCRIPT-Gov-Christie-speaks-Bridgewater-gay-marriage. The Governor also
indicated a belief that “if New Jersey is seriously looking to overturn hundreds of
years of societal, legal and religious tradition, we need to give this issue the weight it
merits” by “giving New Jerseyans the ability to give voice to the support or opposition
of this measure.” Id. The Governor caused some controversy among civil rights
leaders when he indicated at a press conference that, “[p]eople would have been
happy to have a referendum on civil rights rather than fighting and dying in the
streets in the South.” Matt Katz, Christie Calls for Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://articles.philly.com/2012-0125/news/30663269_1_gay-marriage-bill-marriage-referendum-marriage-equality/3.
Currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature is a concurrent resolution: the
constitutionally prescribed mechanism for placing public questions on the ballot at a
general election, amending the state constitution to define “marriage” as “the legally
recognized union of two persons of any gender.” SCR-88, 215th Sen. (N.J. 2012).
The current situation in New Jersey represents a somewhat unusual twist on the facts
surrounding the public initiatives discussed elsewhere in this Comment. There are
mixed views among proponents as to whether to proceed with the referendum.
Governor Christie opposes same-sex marriage, but has indicated he would accept the
results of any public referendum on the topic, while a majority of the Legislature, but
not a veto-proof majority, support same-sex marriage, but not a public referendum.
Katz, supra (noting that Senate President Stephen Sweeney announced that “[c]ivil
rights will not be placed on the ballot”). Moreover, the public initiative is phrased as
an expansion, rather than a reduction, of the currently existing rights of same-sex
couples in contrast to the circumstances in California and Colorado, for example.
Though anomalous in this regard, Governor Christie’s attempt to circumvent the
legislature emphasizes the conflict between minority rights and direct democracy
and suggests that direct democratic processes must be restrained.
The debate over same-sex marriage and the use of direct democratic processes is
not limited to New Jersey. On February 13, 2012, Washington Governor Chris
Gregoire signed into law a measure that would legalize same-sex marriage.
Washington Gov Signs Gay Marriage Bill into Law, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-13/washington-state-gaymarriage-law/53079236/1. The law would not take effect until June 7, 2012, and
soon after Governor Gregoire signed the measure into law, opponents of same-sex
marriage were preparing to challenge the measure, including a ballot initiative to be
proposed for the November 2012 election that would require voters to either
approve or overturn the new measure. Id. Washington voters ultimately voted to
uphold the law allowing for same-sex marriage. Same-Sex Marriage Wins on the Ballot
for the First Time in American History, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 7, 2012, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/same-sex-marriage-wins-on-theballot-for-the-first-time-in-american-history/264704/. In early 2012 in Maryland, the
state legislature’s House Judiciary and Health and Government Operations
Committees conducted hearings on a bill that would legalize same-sex marriage. Md.
Advocates Pack Gay Marriage Hearing, Delegate Says Child Abuse Attempt Formed his View,
ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdhouse-panels-to-hear-gay-marriage-arguments-committees-will-consider-dueling
-bills/2012/02/10/gIQAt6Y02Q_story.html.
Opponents of same-sex marriage
threatened to challenge the measure, if passed, via a 2012 general election
referendum. Id. The law passed, and Maryland voters ultimately upheld the law by
voting against a ballot measure in opposition to the law in the November 2012
election. John Wagner, Paul Schwartzman, & Ned Martel, Maryland Approves Same-Sex
Marriage Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201211-07/local/35505987_1_marriage-law-marriage-measure-maryland-and-maine.
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E. States Should Adopt Reforms Mirroring the District of Columbia’s
Human Rights Safeguard
Just as the District of Columbia Council was attuned to the
events at the time of the enactment of the Safeguard, so too should
states recognize that the initiative is sometimes used today to target
politically vulnerable minorities.
As contemporaneous events
afforded the District of Columbia Council good reason “to anticipate
that an initiative or referendum that would have the effect of
authorizing discrimination could be a threat to the peace and to life
380
and limb,” modern state governments ought to take notice of the
District of Columbia’s experience and recognize that ballot initiatives
are being used, not to achieve social progress, but to target minority
rights. The District of Columbia’s continuous prioritization of
protecting minority rights is evidenced by the District having the
most stringent subject-matter limitation on the right to utilize the
initiative process. Moreover, the Council’s focus on the Reitman
decision is persuasive. The Human Rights Safeguard ensures that
citizens cannot use the initiative to strip a government of “neutrality
381
toward protected minority classifications.”
Without a safeguard, a
majority of the electorate can use the ballot initiative to put the
government in a position of sanctioning discrimination.
By focusing on particular constitutionally defined rights or
provisions as opposed to the government’s sanctioning of
discrimination, there may always remain a segment of the population
unprotected by the will of the majority. The Human Rights
Safeguard provides a strong, preemptive check on potentially
threatening majoritarian politics. The courts play an integral role in
the direct democratic process and in the protection of minority
rights, but the Human Rights Safeguard ensures that the fate of
minority rights are not left to judicial intervention.
The Populists and Progressives originally promoted the initiative
as a means of making the elected accountable to the electorate;
Meanwhile, voters approved a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
in North Carolina in May 2012. David Zucchino, North Carolina Passes Ban on Gay
Marriage, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may
/09/nation/la-na-gay-marriage-20120509. Minnesota voters also defeated a measure
that would have allowed for same-sex marriage in November, 2012. Debbi Wilgoren,
Minnesota Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/07/minnesota
-voters-reject-same-sex-marriage-ban/.
380
Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 112 n.44 (D.C. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
381
See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9.
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similarly, the broad purpose of the CAA was to provide accountability
382
The entire electorate means just
of the elected to the electorate.
that—if certain minority segments of a community can be targeted by
others, the initiative process cannot serve its intended purpose. By
allowing the Board to reject any initiative that would place the
383
District in the posture of condoning discrimination, the District’s
citizens can use the initiative process to hold their government
accountable and promote policy change while promoting
accountability to the entire electorate. The Human Rights Safeguard,
therefore, supplements judicial intervention, allows for direct
democratic methods to affect social change, and ensures that
politically powerful majorities cannot limit minority rights through
ballot initiatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without
which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it
nourishes faction that it would be to wish annihilation of
air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to its
384
destructive agency.
Liberty must be moderated. As Gamble has aptly concluded,
how a society treats a “threat to political minorities is one of the most
385
volatile issues a society can face.” The way a society treats its most
vulnerable is a testament to the value that society places on humanity,
democracy, and liberty. And while the process of direct democracy
may have its place in a representative democracy, direct democracy
must be tempered by justice.
The initiative remains popular in this country, and as current
386
trends seem to indicate, direct democratic processes are prevalently
used to legislate minority rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, it is
more likely that additional states will adopt initiative procedures than
387
it is that any state will repeal them.
The increasing popularity of
the initiative suggests the need for immediate reform. Absent the
checks that representative democracy provides, minorities cannot be

382

Jackson, 999 A.2d at 105.
See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9.
384
Smith, supra note 17, at 563.
385
Gamble, supra note 115, at 262.
386
See, e.g., supra note 379.
387
Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot
Initiative: Procedures That do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 56 (1995).
383
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protected without adequate safeguards, and the threat to vulnerable
minority groups will become more pervasive without action to reform
initiative procedures to account for the direct threat to minority
rights.
Jurisdictions ought to adopt the Human Rights Safeguard, as
exemplified in the District of Columbia. Keeping human rights off of
the ballot and out of the reach of majoritarian politics is essential to
the promise of liberty upon which this county is founded. Moreover,
the Human Rights Safeguard reform can preserve the attributes of
direct democracy, allowing the electorate a voice to participate in
governance and to hold elected officials accountable. Further, with
such a reform, courts will not be the only shield against human rights
violations by initiative, and the rights of vulnerable minorities will
thereby be protected.

